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Abstract
This paper quantiﬁes the eﬀect of time-varying employment risks on the
ﬂuctuations of aggregate consumption in a dynamic general equilibrium with
incomplete markets. A government’s redistribution policy through provision of
unemployment insurance can cause a positive correlation between aggregate con-
sumption and government’s payments due to precautionary savings eﬀects. The
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1underlying mechanism is that a reduction of unemployment risk increases ex-
pected lifetime income substantially across a wide range of asset-holding groups
when the risk reduction is suﬃciently persistent. By contrast, the correlation
between consumption and government becomes negative when the government
intervention hampers supply of goods.
Keywords: Time-varying idiosyncratic risk, employment risk, precautionary sav-
ings, regime-switching ﬁscal policy
JEL codes: E21, E62
1 Introduction
In this paper, we ask in what circumstances ﬁscal policies lead to the comovement of
aggregate consumption and government expenditure. We focus on the comovement
mechanism via time-varying unemployment risks. Consider a government project that
will hire a fraction of unemployed workers. The reduced unemployment rate decreases
an idiosyncratic unemployment hazard that workers will face. This change in risk en-
vironment induces the workers to consume more, since they reduce the precautionary
savings in incomplete markets where consumers cannot insure against their idiosyn-
cratic unemployment risk. The purpose of this paper is to quantify the movement in
consumption when various types of ﬁscal policies aﬀect the magnitude of idiosyncratic
unemployment risks.
This paper is motivated by recent developments in empirical estimation on the ef-
fects of ﬁscal policy on consumption. Researchers such as Fat´ as and Mihov [10], Blan-
chard and Perotti [3], and Gal´ ı, Valle´ es, and L´ opez-Salido [12] have found a positive
correlation between consumption and government spending in identiﬁed VAR estima-
tion. Their ﬁndings contrast with the negative estimates obtained for war-time events
2by Ramey and Shapiro [17], Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher [8], and Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Fisher [4].
Gal´ ı et al. proposes a model of rule-of-thumb consumers to account for the positive
comovement between consumption and government expenditure, whereas the standard
dynamic general equilibrium model with ﬁscal shocks such as Baxter and King [2] is
consistent with the negative correlation. We propose a diﬀerent avenue to account for
the comovement. We highlight the macroeconomic eﬀects of precautionary savings,
which have been analyzed by authors such as Aiyagari [1], Carroll [5], and Huggett
[13].
The precautionary motive of savings provides a possible answer to the excess sensi-
tivity of consumption which states that consumption seems to respond to a change in
income more than the permanent income hypothesis predicts. In incomplete markets
where there is no insurance provided for individual employment shocks, households
can partially insure against such hazard by accumulating wealth. The precaution-
ary savings behavior implies a concave consumption function with respect to wealth.
Thus, a windfall of income to the households in a low wealth group would generate
an increase in consumption that is larger than the small wealth eﬀect implied by the
permanent income hypothesis. If this channel of income eﬀect is quantitatively large,
it can have important consequences on macroeconomic predictions such as the impact
of the expansionary ﬁscal policy on the aggregate demand.
Krusell and Smith [14] formally analyze a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model with incomplete markets and with aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. They
ﬁnd that the consumption function in such an economy is almost linear in wealth,
and therefore the aggregate consequence of incomplete markets in the business cycles
frequency is limited. Carroll [5] argues that Krusell and Smith’s model can underesti-
3mate the eﬀect of precautionary savings, because it generates a fairly centered wealth
distribution whereas the curvature of the consumption function concentrates on the
low wealth levels.
This paper focuses on a diﬀerent channel of precautionary eﬀects on consumption:
time-varying idiosyncratic risk. The demand for precautionary savings are aﬀected by
the magnitude of idiosyncratic employment risk that individual households bear. We
consider that the magnitude of the employment risk ﬂuctuates as the unemployment
rates vary. When the unemployment is high, there is a higher chance of losing jobs
for the households who are currently employed, and a lower chance of ﬁnding jobs for
those who are unemployed. Since the unemployment rate ﬂuctuates in the business
cycles frequency, it is possible that the households’ savings decision also ﬂuctuates in
this frequency. Namely, the households consume less when the unemployment rate
is high, because the high unemployment implies high risk for the current and future
employment and thus induces households to save so that they can partially hedge
against the risk.
There has been little formal quantitative analysis on the impact of the changing
unemployment risk on the aggregate consumption. We ﬁnd that aggregate consumption
can respond strongly to the employment risk under conventional calibration. Consider
the case where a ﬁscal intervention reduces the unemployment rate. This policy has an
obvious eﬀect on consumption through an increased level of employment: a fraction of
workers switch from the unemployed status to the employed status, and they increase
consumption. There is a less obvious eﬀect of this policy: all the households perceive
the reduction in the employment risk, and thus they start to dissave their wealth. This
eﬀect is observed for a wide range of wealth levels of households. Thus, the wealth
distribution seems to matter less than the case of a windfall income.
4It is hard to quantify the eﬀect of precautionary savings analytically, and thus we use
the numerical method developed by Krusell and Smith. The original Krusell and Smith
model does contain a time-varying idiosyncratic risk, as the unemployment hazard in
the model depends on the time-varying aggregate state. However, it is hard to identify
the contribution of the time-varying idiosyncratic risk to consumption in their model,
because the magnitude of risk moves along with aggregate productivity. Instead, here
we associate the time-varying risk to switching regimes of ﬁscal policy. We consider two
kinds of ﬁscal policy. First, we consider a simple model of unemployment insurance.
In one regime, government is non-interventionist. In the other regime, government
provides a fraction of unemployed workers with unemployment compensation that is
ﬁnanced by lump sum taxation. In the second model, we consider a switching rate of
corporate tax. The employment rate ﬂuctuates along with the corporate tax, and so
does the unemployment hazard rate.
Our main ﬁndings are following. First, a pure transfer of wealth from the em-
ployed to the unemployed through the unemployment insurance policy can increase
aggregate consumption, and thus cause a comovement of consumption and government
payments. While the correlation coeﬃcient is substantial, the impact on consumption
is quantitatively small. Secondly, the impact on consumption becomes large, while the
correlation between the consumption and government payments remains positive, if
the provision of the unemployment compensation comes along with an increase in the
resource available to the economy. We consider two such cases: the case of productive
government activity and the case of foreign trade. Thirdly, we consider the case of
switching corporate tax rather than the unemployment insurance. A combination of a
reduced tax and a reduced government spending enhances the employment of private
ﬁrms. In this case, the magnitude of consumption response is as large as the case of
5productive government, while the correlation between consumption and government
spending becomes negative in a balanced budget scheme. These ﬁndings seem to ﬁt
well with the mixed results on the comovement between consumption and government
spending found in the empirical literature.
Government’s employment is similar to the unemployment insurance in the func-
tion that they both transfer wealth from the employed workers to the unemployed.
Finn [11] studies the macroeconomic eﬀects of the government’s employment in a dy-
namic general equilibrium model with complete markets. Cavallo [6] ﬁnds that the
model with government labor purchases helps explain the consumption response in
the Ramey-Shapiro episodes. Our contribution in this context is to provide quanti-
tative assessments of the eﬀect of government labor expenditures on consumption in
an economy with incomplete markets, where the precautionary savings eﬀect plays an
important role. The link between the unemployment insurance and the precautionary
savings is pursued by Engen and Gruber [9], who ﬁnd evidence for the eﬀect that the
insurance reduces the savings in households data.
Next section presents the model economy. Section 3 shows main results, and Section
4 concludes the paper. Details of computation is deferred to Appendix.
2 Model
We consider a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with incomplete markets,
uninsurable employment shocks, and aggregate shocks as Krusell and Smith [14] (KS
henceforth). The economy is populated by a continuum of households with population









t /(1 − σ) (1)
s.t. ct + kt+1 = (rt + 1 − δ)kt + wtht − τt, ∀t (2)
where ct is the consumption, kt is the capital asset, ht is the labor, τt is the lump sum
tax, rt is the gross return to capital and wt is the real wage where the consumption
good is the numeraire. The capital depreciates at the rate δ, and the future utility is
discounted by β. The household is either unemployed (ht = 0) or employed (ht = 1),
and ht follows an exogenous process as discussed shortly.
The representative ﬁrm produces goods with the technology speciﬁed by a Cobb-
Douglas production function with constant returns to scale Yt = Kα
t H
1−α
t where Yt is
the aggregate goods produced and Kt and Ht are the aggregate capital and labor. The
ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt in a competitive market, where the following conditions hold:
rt = α(Kt/Ht)
α−1 (3)
wt = (1 − α)(Kt/Ht)
α. (4)
Our model features a ﬁscal policy as the aggregate shock. We ﬁrst consider a partial
provision of an unemployment insurance by the government. The ﬁscal policy zt follows
a Markov process with two states {0,1} and with a transition matrix [πzz0]. The gov-
ernment is inactive in state zt = 0. The lump sum tax is set at zero and the aggregate
unemployment rate stays at a high rate u0. In state zt = 1, the government provides a
full unemployment compensation wt for a fraction of the unemployed households. We
can interpret the unemployment compensation as a “buy-out” of the fraction of the
unemployed labor force and thus it constitutes a wage expenditure of the government.
The fraction of the households who are neither employed by the ﬁrms nor bought-out
7by the government is u1, which is strictly less than u0. The lump-sum tax is equal
to the aggregate amount of contemporaneous unemployment compensation. Thus, the





0 if zt = 0
wt(u0 − u1) if zt = 1
(5)
In this set up, the aggregate labor supplied for ﬁrms is exogenously constant at Ht =
1 − u1 for any t regardless of zt, whereas the total workers employed by ﬁrms or
government is either 1 − u0 or 1 − u1 depending on zt.
We consider that the aggregate shock zt aﬀects the transition probability of the
individual employment status ht. Let Π denote the transition matrix for the pair of
the individual labor and the ﬁscal policy status, (ht,zt). The transition probability from
(h,z) to (h0,z0) is denoted by πhh0zz0. In our model, the aggregate shock z determines
both the employment level and the ﬁscal policy regime. We set the regime switching
probability so that the average duration of each regime is 8 quarters in the benchmark
calibration, following KS. In an alternative calibration, we set the transition probability
by using Davig’s [7] estimates on the regime switching of the US ﬁscal policy.
A recursive competitive equilibrium is deﬁned as follows. The household’s maxi-
mization problem is written as a dynamic programming with state variables (k,h,z,Γ)
where Γ is the cross-section distribution of (ki,hi) across households i ∈ [0,1]. The
law of motion for (h,z) is determined by the exogenous transition matrix Π. Deﬁne
a transition function T that maps Γ to the next period distribution Γ0. The recursive
competitive equilibrium is deﬁned by the value function V (k,h,z,Γ), the policy func-
tion F of the household, and the transition function T, such that V and F solve the
household’s problem under T and the competitive factor prices that satisfy (3,4), that
they are consistent with the market clearing conditions K =
R
kidΓ and H =
R
hidΓ,
8and that T is consistent with F and Π. The goods market clears by Walras’s law,
C + K0 − (1 − δ)K = Y , where C =
R
cidi is the aggregate consumption.
We calibrate parameters largely following KS for the sake of comparison. The
transition matrix Π must satisfy:
uz(π00zz0/πzz0) + (1 − uz)(π10zz0/πzz0) = uz0, z ∈ {0,1} (6)
to be compatible with the aggregate labor employed by ﬁrms or government, 1−u. We
also restrict Π so that the mean duration of unemployment is 1.5 quarters for the state
0 and 2.5 for 1, and that π0001 = 0.75π0011 and π0010 = 1.25π0011 following KS. These
restrictions fully determine Π. The calibration of the other parameters draws on KS
as α = 0.36, β = 0.99, δ = 0.025, σ = 1, u0 = 0.1, and u1 = 0.04. We approximate the
transition function T by a linear mapping of logK. Following Mukoyama and S ¸ahin
[15], we specify that the slope of the function is common but the constants can vary
across z:
logK
0 = az + blogKz + , z ∈ {0,1} (7)
Simulations show that the linear transition function on the ﬁrst moment provides a
suﬃciently accurate forecast on the future aggregate capital as in KS.
3 Results
3.1 Unemployment insurance
We ﬁrst consider the model with unemployment insurance which is ﬁnanced by con-
temporaneous lump sum tax (5), leaving the government budget balanced all the time.
This is a pure transfer policy that levies lump sum tax and distributes the proceeds to
a fraction u0 − u1 of randomly selected unemployed workers. Aggregate production is
9not aﬀected by this policy, unless capital level is changed. Table 1 shows the consump-
tion for diﬀerent states. Cz denotes the average aggregate consumption for policy state
z. Ce
z and Cu
z denote the average consumption for the employed and the unemployed,
respectively, for z. In parentheses are the standard errors for the estimated moments
obtained by 30 iterated runs. The current model speciﬁcation corresponds to the policy
regime “UI I” in the table.
In Table 1, we note that the consumption of the unemployed increases by 1.54%
by the provision of unemployment insurance (the policy transition from 0 to 1). This
shows the precautionary savings eﬀect: since the government policy reduces the un-
employment hazard, the households with low current income and wealth is inclined to
increase consumption. Next, we note that the average consumption of the employed is
reduced by 0.21%. This is because the employed suﬀers from the policy that transfers
a part of their wealth to the unemployed.
The overall consumption is increased by 0.03% by the policy. Note that the pre-
cautionary motives aﬀect all groups of workers. The lump-sum transfer per se also
aﬀects the consumption of all workers negatively. The point of the exercise here is to
quantify the diﬀerence in the eﬀects of the two forces on the employed and unemployed
groups. We observe a positive overall impact of the transfer policy on the aggregate
consumption, which indicates that the positive precautionary eﬀect outweighs the neg-
ative wealth eﬀect.
To distinguish the precautionary eﬀect, we decompose the overall eﬀect as in Table
2. We consider three groups of workers: u1 = 4% of workers who remain unemployed
before and after the policy transition, u0 − u1 = 6% of workers who transit from the
unemployed to the employed by the policy, and 1 − u1 = 90% of workers who remain
employed before and after. Note that the composition of each group reshuﬄes in each








0 2.4766 2.4083 2.4698 2.5253 2.4642 2.5192 2.3830 2.3038 2.3751
(0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0000) (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0019)
1 2.4715 2.4458 2.4704 2.5546 2.5373 2.5539 2.4094 2.3825 2.4083
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0018)
log diﬀ. -0.0021 0.0154 0.0003 0.0115 0.0293 0.0137 0.0110 0.0336 0.0139
Table 1: Consumption changes in policy transition for average workers in diﬀerent
groups. UI I is the case of unemployment insurance as a means of pure wealth transfer,
UI II is the case of government’s productive employment, and UI III is the case of





0 (u0 − u1)logCe
1/Cu
0 logC1/C0
UI I -0.0019 0.0006 0.0016 0.0003
UI II 0.0104 0.0012 0.0022 0.0137
UI III 0.0099 0.0013 0.0027 0.0139
Table 2: Contributions to aggregate consumption growth by diﬀerent groups of workers
11period during the new policy regime, but it does not aﬀect the aggregate property of
the group, because each group consists of uncountably many workers who are ex-ante
identical. Each of the workers in the ﬁrst group (unemployed to unemployed) increases
consumption by 1.54%, and thus the group as a whole contributes to the rise of total
consumption by 0.06 percentage. Each worker in the second group (unemployed to
employed) increases consumption by 2.59% (logCe
1 − logCu
0), which amounts to 0.16
percentage rise in total consumption. Finally, each worker in the third group (employed
to employed) reduces the consumption by 0.21%, which results in 0.19 percentage
reduction in total consumption. The net increase in overall consumption is 0.03%.
Note that the fall in consumption by the employed workers in the third group is almost
cancelled out by the increase in consumption by the workers in the second group who
newly receive compensations from the government. This corresponds to the direct
eﬀect of the wealth transfer from the employed to the unemployed. The net increase in
total consumption thus comes from the contribution of the unemployed workers, who
dissave precautionary savings due to the reduced unemployment risk. This shows that
the precautionary savings eﬀect is present in aggregation, and that its quantitative
importance is limited at least in the case of pure wealth transfer.
Table 3 summarizes the key aggregate statistics obtained by the simulation. Gov-
ernment expenditure Gt is the payment for the unemployed, and satisﬁes Gt = τt.
We note that Gt correlates positively with aggregate consumption Ct. Thus, the gov-
ernment’s transfer of wealth from the employed to the unemployed causes a positive
correlation with total consumption. The correlation between C and G is fairly high
at 0.43. We should note, however, that the magnitude of the movement is small, as
the standard deviation of the total consumption is only 0.03%. We also observe that
the output and government spending are almost uncorrelated. This is because the
12s.d. Y s.d. C corr(Y,C) corr(Y,I) corr(Y,G) corr(C,G)
UI I 0.0002 0.0003 0.2724 0.5116 -0.0491 0.4352
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0167) (0.0311) (0.0225) (0.0228)
UI II 0.0234 0.0125 0.7363 0.9326 0.9707 0.5525
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0068) (0.0036) (0.0013) (0.0040)
UI III 0.0061 0.0129 0.9642 -0.7720 1.0000 0.9642
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0030) (0.0149) (0.0000) (0.0030)
Tax I 0.0235 0.0123 0.6157 0.9240 -0.9574 -0.3623
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0124) (0.0034) (0.0016) (0.0094)
Tax II 0.0254 0.0189 0.7458 0.8529 -0.9191 -0.4235
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0110) (0.0073) (0.0033) (0.0074)
Table 3: Second moments for diﬀerent policy schemes
13Ce/Cu C I/Y k ˆ R2 ˆ a0 ˆ a1 ˆ b
UI I 1.0197 2.4702 0.2523 33.3489 0.9986 0.0053 0.0054 0.9985
(0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0030) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
UI II 1.0157 2.5367 0.2451 32.9508 0.9999 0.1358 0.1321 0.9616
(0.0005) (0.0022) (0.0001) (0.0375) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
UI III 1.0229 2.3915 0.2703 32.6184 1.0000 0.1377 0.1339 0.9610
(0.0006) (0.0025) (0.0004) (0.0412) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Tax I 1.0153 2.5301 0.2429 32.4711 1.0000 0.1322 0.1281 0.9626
(0.0003) (0.0015) (0.0001) (0.0290) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Tax II 1.0156 2.4438 0.2685 32.4567 0.9999 0.1326 0.1266 0.9627
(0.0006) (0.0037) (0.0001) (0.0705) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Table 4: Other estimates
workers hired by the government are not productive in this experiment. Thus, the
level of productive employment stays ﬁxed during policy transitions. The ﬂuctuation
of output is solely caused by the small movement of capital. Table 4 lists the other
estimates. The column Ce/Cu shows the ratio of average consumptions between the
employed and unemployed. While households partially hedge the unemployment risk
by accumulating wealth, a substantial gap (1.97%) remains uninsured. The last three
columns show the approximated law of motion for the capital distribution. The R2
shows that the approximation is quite accurate.
The benchmark model above indicates the positive eﬀect on consumption caused
by the provision of unemployment insurance through precautionary motives of sav-
ings. However, the eﬀect is quantitatively small, because the policy does not aﬀect
14production. From now on, we explore the models in which a rise in employment by the
government policy increases contemporaneous resources available to the economy.
First we consider a variation of the benchmark model, in which government has a
linear technology to produce goods. Namely, the government employs u0 −u1 workers
and produces (u0 −u1)wt value added. The employment is ﬁnanced by the sales of the
goods at the goods market, and thus no tax is levied: τt = 0 for all t. This is a model
of productive government activities. A linear production function is natural for the
government, because GDP statistics include government’s salary expenditure as value
added. The government’s output adds to the supply side of the goods market, thus the
goods market clearing condition becomes C + K0 − (1 − δ)K = Y + (u0 − u1)w.
The simulation results for this model of productive government are reported under
“UI II” in the tables. We ﬁrst note that the output and consumption ﬂuctuates much
more than the benchmark case UI I. In Table 3, the standard deviations of output and
consumption amounts to 2.34% and 1.25%, respectively. This is a direct consequence
of the switching activities of the productive government.
Second, we note that the consumption is increased for the employed as well as for the
unemployed in the periods of insurance provision. Table 1 shows that the consumption
of the employed increases by 1.15%. In the benchmark setup, the consumption of the
employed decreases because they have to pay the lump sum tax during the regime
of insurance provision. In the present setup, there is no tax levied for the insurance
policy. Thus, the expected lifetime income of the employed workers increases by the
prospect of less unemployment hazard in the near future. This reduces the need for
precautionary savings and thus increases the consumption of the employed. While
the increase in average consumption of the employed is modest at 1.15% compared
to 2.93% increase for the unemployed, its contribution to the total consumption is
15large because of its large share among workers. As seen in the decomposition in Table
2, the employed groups contributes more than three quarters of the increase in total
consumption (1.04/1.37). The correlation between C and G is also high at 0.55.
Note that the wage rate is determined only by the capital level and not aﬀected
by the policy regime, because the employment of ﬁrms does not change by the policy.
Thus, when the policy switches, the expected lifetime income changes largely through
the change in perceived employment risks in future. The big impact on the consumption
of the employed workers indicates that the risk environment is important in determining
the consumption demand of the large mass of workers.
We consider another variation of the benchmark model, in which government has
a storage technology. The government collects lump-sum tax in every period and
stores the proceeds. The government transfers the storage to the unemployed workers
during the periods when it adopts the unemployment insurance policy. One example of
such storage technology is a trade with foreign countries. Government can accumulate
foreign assets during the inactive periods, and use the assets to import goods in the
periods of active policy. To ﬁnance the storage/trading activities, the government
collects lump sum tax that is constant across periods. In this setup, workers face a
constant tax burden across time, and the government budget is generally imbalanced
as the policy switches.
The simulation results for this model are reported under “UI III” in the tables.
We observe that the statistics are similar to the case of productive government (UI
II): the output and consumption ﬂuctuate much more than the benchmark case UI I,
and the correlation between consumption and government payment is positive. The
consumption of the employed is increased during the active policy periods by 1.1%, and
it accounts for 71% of the total consumption increase. The mechanism is similar as the
16productive government model. Since the policy regime does not aﬀect the wage nor
the tax the workers pay in every period, the increase in the expected lifetime income
is largely caused by the prospect of less unemployment hazard in future.
3.2 Corporate tax
In this section, we consider an alternative government intervention. We replace the
unemployment compensation program with a regime-switching tax rate as studied in
Davig [7]. We will see that the government-consumption correlation hinges on how
the government intervention aﬀects the contemporaneous resources available to the
economy.
We consider that the government levies a ﬂat-rate tax on ﬁrms’ revenue. The tax
rate ξt ﬂuctuates between two states according to the Markov process speciﬁed by Π.
We continue to assume the exogenous aggregate employment process that ﬂuctuates
between two states u0 and u1 along with the policy status z ∈ {0,1}. An implicit
mechanism underlying the exogenous employment process is that, when the tax rate
is low, labor demand shifts out and employment is increased. The production factors
are paid for their after-tax marginal products: rt = (1 − ξt)α(Kt/(1 − ut))α−1 and
wt = (1−ξt)(1−α)(Kt/(1−ut))α. We set the tax rate so that real wage is independent
of the policy status. Then the tax rate is set as:
ξ(z) = 1 − (1 − uz)
α, z = 0,1. (8)
When zt = 0, the tax is high at ξ(0) and the unemployment is high at u0. When zt = 1,
the tax is low at ξ(1) and the unemployment is low at u1.
We consider two cases for the government expenditure. In the ﬁrst case, which we
call “Tax I”, the tax proceeds are rebated to the households in a lump sum manner. By






0 2.5238 2.4666 2.5181 2.4291 2.3710 2.4233
(0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0032) (0.0040) (0.0033)
1 2.5425 2.5238 2.5417 2.4649 2.4479 2.4642
(0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0029)
log diﬀ. 0.0074 0.0229 0.0093 0.0146 0.0319 0.0168
Table 5: Consumption changes in policy transition for average workers in diﬀerent
groups. Tax I is the case of corporate tax with lump sum rebates, and Tax II is the





0 (u0 − u1)logCe
1/Cu
0 logC1/C0
Tax I 0.0066 0.0009 0.0018 0.0093
Tax II 0.0132 0.0013 0.0023 0.0168
Table 6: Contributions to aggregate consumption growth by diﬀerent groups of workers:
Case of corporate tax
abuse of notation, we redeﬁne −τt as the lump sum transfer. Then −τt = ξtYt. Using
this notation, the household’s budget constraint continues to be written as (2). In the
second case (“Tax II”), the tax proceeds are used by the government for non-productive
activities (i.e., thrown into the ocean). In this case, the transfer τt is zero for every
t. The government expenditure Gt is equal to the tax proceeds ξtYt, and it appears in
the demand side of the goods market clearing condition: C +K0 −(1−δ)K +G = Y .
Table 5 shows the consumption for various states. We note that the consumption
18increases in the periods of low tax for both the employed and the unemployed workers
in both models Tax I and II. Table 6 shows the decomposition of the total consumption
growth into the contributions of the groups of workers according to the employment
status. The contribution of the employed workers is substantial in both models: 71%
in Tax I and 79% in Tax II.
In Tax I, the tax proceeds are rebated back to the households, so the tax is a
distortionary transfer from the ﬁrms to the households. The lowered tax rate induces
higher labor demand and larger output. While the real wage is held ﬁxed, the lump
sum transfer to the households is reduced during the low tax periods. The reduced
transfer income should hurt the consumption demand of the unemployed. Nonetheless,
the consumption of the unemployed is increased by 2.29% by the tax reduction. This
shows that the wealth eﬀect of the prospect of low unemployment hazard overwhelms
the eﬀect of less transfer income.
This wealth eﬀect can be directly observed in Tax II. In Tax II, both the real wage
and the government transfer (zero) are ﬁxed during the policy transitions, and thus
the contemporaneous income of the employed workers is not aﬀected by the policy at
all. Table 5 shows that the consumption of the employed is increased considerably by
1.46%.
The magnitude of the ﬂuctuations in consumption and output is as large in the
corporate tax model as the productive government model of the unemployment insur-
ance (UI II) as seen in Table 3. This is because the reduction of the corporate tax
increases productive employments in the ﬁrms sector. The corporate tax models and
the productive government model share the similar supply side mechanism and the
consumer behavior, which leads to the similarity in the moment properties in output,
consumption, and investment.
19The correlations between government expenditure (or transfer) with output and
consumption become negative in the tax models. The reason is that the government’s
intervention is distortionary and suppresses labor input, and thus less government
activities induce more production and consumption. This result contrasts with the
model of unemployment insurance. This shows that the correlation of the government
expenditure and consumption depends on whether the government activity suppresses
production or not.
We conduct two sets of sensitivity analysis. First, we increase the risk aversion
parameter to σ = 3. The results are shown in Appendix C. We note that the con-
sumption eﬀect of pure wealth transfer in UI I is doubled. This is consistent with our
intuition: the households who are sensitive to risks respond more to the reduced risks.
Other statistics are similar to the case of σ = 1. In the second sensitivity analysis, we
set the parameters following Davig’s [7] estimation of the regime-switching ﬁscal policy.
The results are shown in Appendix D. Overall, we observe more ﬂuctuations and larger
responses to the policy. This is because the average duration of policy regimes is much
longer under this calibration. The results are consistent with our expectation that the
eﬀect of policy is ampliﬁed when the policy regime is more persistent.
4 Conclusion
This paper quantitatively studies the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
with idiosyncratic employment risk, when the magnitude of employment risk is changed
over time as ﬁscal policies switch between two regimes stochastically. In the experi-
ments, we consider two kinds of ﬁscal policies: unemployment insurance and corporate
tax. The unemployment insurance model provides a simple case which facilitates our
20interpretations of the result, whereas the corporate tax model examines the case where
government activities hinder private sector’s production.
We ﬁnd that the government policy that reduces the unemployment hazard can
increase the aggregate consumption demand by a non-negligible magnitude. In a pure
wealth transfer from the employed to the unemployed workers, we observe a positive
correlation between the aggregate consumption and the government’s transfer pay-
ments, but it’s magnitude is small. The correlation is positive and the impact of policy
on consumption becomes large, if the unemployment insurance program enhances the
resources available to the economy. We show two examples: the case where the gov-
ernment’s employment generates value added, and the case where the government can
trade with foreign countries. Finally, we ﬁnd that the correlation between the consump-
tion and government spending is negative, when we consider a distortionary corporate
tax. This shows that the consumption-government correlation depends on how the
policy aﬀects the supply of goods.
We decompose the impact of the policy on the aggregate consumption into three
eﬀects: the increased fraction of employed households, the reduced unemployment haz-
ard for the employed workers, and the increased employment chance for the unemployed
workers. We ﬁnd the eﬀect of reduced employment hazard for the employed workers
considerably large, when the tax burden for the employed workers is held ﬁxed. The
eﬀect of the reduced risk can be large, because it aﬀects not only the unemployed but
also a wide range of the employed households. It makes a contrast with the eﬀect of
a windfall income which aﬀects a relatively small fraction of workers whose borrowing
constraints are binding.
21Appendix
A Details of computation
The state space for the household’s capital ki is discretized by 1000 grids equally
divided in the range [−3,100]. The lower bound is chosen so that the gap in the
consumption growth rates between the low asset and the high asset holders roughly
matches with Zeldes’ estimate [18, 16]. The upper bound is chosen to be high enough
so that households do not reach the upper bound in simulated paths. The number of
the grids is chosen to be high enough so that the further increase of the grids does not
change simulated mean capital. The state space for the mean capital is discretized by
ﬁve grids.
Given the approximated law of motion of the joint distribution of the capital holding
and the employment states, the value function is obtained by the iteration of the
Bellman equation. To evaluate the value function at the forecasted mean capital in the
next period, we interpolate the value function in the dimension of the mean capital by
the spline method.
Once the value function is obtained, we simulate the equilibrium path with 1000
households for 10000 periods. In each period of the simulation, the policy function is
interpolated at the current mean capital level by the spline method, and the interpo-
lated policy function evaluated at the current mean capital and the current aggregate
state is further ﬁtted by a quadratic function for each employment state. Fitting by
the higher-degree polynomial functions does not alter the results. The ﬁtted function
is then used to compute the next-period capital holding for each household. The simu-
lated mean capital path for the last 9000 periods is used to estimate the law of motion
22of the form (7). The tolerance for the value function iteration is 0.01 in the sup norm.
The tolerance for the law of motion is 0.001 for the coeﬃcients in (7).
23B Simulation plots
B.1 Sample paths of output and consumption for diﬀerent
models
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Figure 1: Sample time series of Y and C. The policy regime z is shown by the dotted
line. Top: UI I, II, and III. Bottom: Tax I and II. Note that there is little output
volatility for UI I and UI III.
24B.2 Computed functions for UI II when σ = 1
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Figure 2: From top left clockwise, value functions, policy functions at medium capital
level, cross-section distribution of capital, and the law of motion of capital and its
approximation, for model UI II and σ = 1.
25B.3 Computed functions for UI II when σ = 3
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Figure 3: Same plot as Figure 2 when σ = 3
26C Sensitivity analysis I: Higher risk aversion








0 2.4442 2.3250 2.4323 2.5046 2.3858 2.4927 2.3688 2.2335 2.3553
(0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0023) (0.0032) (0.0024) (0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0019)
1 2.4363 2.3749 2.4339 2.5223 2.4663 2.5200 2.3852 2.3164 2.3824
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0021)
log diﬀ. -0.0032 0.0212 0.0007 0.0070 0.0332 0.0109 0.0069 0.0364 0.0114





0 (u0 − u1)logCe
1/Cu
0 logC1/C0
UI I -0.0029 0.0008 0.0028 0.0007
UI II 0.0063 0.0013 0.0033 0.0109
UI III 0.0062 0.0015 0.0039 0.0114
Table 8: Same as Table 2 when σ = 3
27s.d. Y s.d. C corr(Y,C) corr(Y,I) corr(Y,G) corr(C,G)
UI I 0.0006 0.0006 0.4125 0.6351 -0.0420 0.5238
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0226) (0.0281) (0.0248) (0.0189)
UI II 0.0242 0.0118 0.7287 0.9442 0.9472 0.4710
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0076) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0036)
UI III 0.0079 0.0119 0.9667 -0.2466 1.0000 0.9667
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0029) (0.0167) (0.0000) (0.0029)
Tax I 0.0242 0.0116 0.6922 0.9421 -0.9302 -0.3796
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0127) (0.0032) (0.0041) (0.0062)
Tax II 0.0270 0.0179 0.7964 0.8985 -0.8678 -0.3913
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0112) (0.0047) (0.0070) (0.0042)
Table 9: Same as Table 3 when σ = 3
28Ce/Cu C I/Y k ˆ R2 ˆ a0 ˆ a1 ˆ b
UI I 1.0385 2.4331 0.2369 30.2065 0.9994 0.0023 0.0023 0.9993
(0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0067) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
UI II 1.0361 2.5063 0.2339 30.6059 1.0000 0.0868 0.0827 0.9752
(0.0007) (0.0028) (0.0002) (0.0668) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0)
UI III 1.0449 2.3688 0.2598 30.5267 1.0000 0.0895 0.0855 0.9744
(0.0006) (0.0023) (0.0002) (0.0550) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0)
Tax I 1.0295 2.5003 0.2321 30.2269 1.0000 0.0819 0.0777 0.9766
(0.0007) (0.0032) (0.0003) (0.0813) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0) (0.0000)
Tax II 1.0351 2.4164 0.2576 30.2020 1.0000 0.0838 0.0776 0.9763
(0.0007) (0.0040) (0.0001) (0.1032) (0.0000) (0) (0) (0.0000)
Table 10: Same as Table 4 when σ = 3






0 2.4985 2.4000 2.4887 2.4098 2.2981 2.3986
(0.0028) (0.0037) (0.0029) (0.0035) (0.0044) (0.0036)
1 2.5136 2.4686 2.5118 2.4369 2.3846 2.4349
(0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0037) (0.0044) (0.0037)
log diﬀ. 0.0060 0.0282 0.0093 0.0112 0.0369 0.0150





0 (u0 − u1)logCe
1/Cu
0 logC1/C0
Tax I 0.0054 0.0011 0.0028 0.0093
Tax II 0.0101 0.0015 0.0035 0.0150
Table 12: Same as Table 6 when σ = 3
30D Sensitivity analysis II: Persistent policy
Parameter values are changed as α = 0.33 and β = 0.9916. Most noticeably, the
transition probability of the policy πzz0 is changed. Following Davig’s estimates, the
policy switches from the high tax regime to the low tax regime in average 25 years,
and the low to high tax regime in average 11 years. This is much more persistent than
the benchmark calibration at 8 quarters.








0 2.0933 1.9833 2.0823 2.1060 1.9928 2.0947 1.9924 1.8524 1.9784
(0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0018) (0.0033) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0017)
1 2.0856 2.0567 2.0845 2.2039 2.1799 2.2030 2.0866 2.0479 2.0851
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0008)
log diﬀ. -0.0037 0.0363 0.0011 0.0454 0.0897 0.0504 0.0462 0.1003 0.0525





0 (u0 − u1)logCe
1/Cu
0 logC1/C0
UI I -0.0033 0.0015 0.0030 0.0011
UI II 0.0409 0.0036 0.0060 0.0504
UI III 0.0416 0.0040 0.0071 0.0525
Table 14: Same as Table 2 for persistent policy
31s.d. Y s.d. C corr(Y,C) corr(Y,I) corr(Y,G) corr(C,G)
UI I 0.0008 0.0009 0.3296 0.6601 -0.5965 0.5204
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0177) (0.0236) (0.0230) (0.0382)
UI II 0.0231 0.0235 0.9918 0.9162 0.9923 0.9686
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0016) (0.0004) (0.0018)
UI III 0.0047 0.0246 0.8945 -0.8181 1.0000 0.8945
(0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0127) (0.0201) (0.0000) (0.0127)
Tax I 0.0284 0.0230 0.9245 0.8762 -0.9595 -0.7798
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0061) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0133)
Tax II 0.0308 0.0335 0.9683 0.7425 -0.9443 -0.8324
(0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0027) (0.0118)
Table 15: Same as Table 3 for persistent policy
32Ce/Cu C I/Y k ˆ R2 ˆ a0 ˆ a1 ˆ b
UI I 1.0259 2.0839 0.2400 26.3253 0.9995 0.0662 0.0664 0.9797
(0.0012) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0058) (0.0000) (0) (0.0000) (0.0000)
UI II 1.0239 2.1707 0.2331 26.3967 0.9996 0.1421 0.1401 0.9568
(0.0020) (0.0051) (0.0002) (0.0361) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
UI III 1.0345 2.0536 0.2562 26.8844 0.9972 0.1451 0.1431 0.9559
(0.0020) (0.0042) (0.0012) (0.0328) (0.0002) (0) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Tax I 1.0194 2.1757 0.2366 26.9754 0.9999 0.1335 0.1297 0.9597
(0.0015) (0.0048) (0.0002) (0.0838) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0) (0.0000)
Tax II 1.0293 2.1231 0.2597 27.5422 0.9991 0.1338 0.1291 0.9597
(0.0019) (0.0071) (0.0004) (0.1133) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0)
Table 16: Same as Table 4 for persistent policy






0 2.1249 2.0277 2.1151 2.0451 1.9266 2.0333
(0.0034) (0.0043) (0.0035) (0.0050) (0.0063) (0.0051)
1 2.2023 2.1846 2.2016 2.1653 2.1312 2.1639
(0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0023)
log diﬀ. 0.0358 0.0745 0.0400 0.0571 0.1009 0.0623





0 (u0 − u1)logCe
1/Cu
0 logC1/C0
Tax I 0.0322 0.0030 0.0050 0.0400
Tax II 0.0514 0.0040 0.0070 0.0623
Table 18: Same as Table 6 for persistent policy
34E Other plots
E.1 Computed functions for the models other than UI II
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Figure 4: Same plot as Figure 2 for UI I and σ = 1.
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Figure 5: Same plot as Figure 2 for UI III and σ = 1.
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Figure 6: Same plot as Figure 2 for Tax I and σ = 1.
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Figure 7: Same plot as Figure 2 for Tax II and σ = 1.
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Figure 8: Same plot as Figure 2 for UI I and σ = 3.
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Figure 9: Same plot as Figure 2 for UI II and σ = 3.
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Figure 10: Same plot as Figure 2 for UI III and σ = 3.
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Figure 11: Same plot as Figure 2 for Tax I and σ = 3.
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Figure 12: Same plot as Figure 2 for Tax II and σ = 3.
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Figure 13: Sample time series of Y and C for the case σ = 3. Top: UI I, II, and III.
Bottom: Tax I and II.
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